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Five hundred years after its first publication, Thomas More’s Utopia con-
tinues to raise intellectual controversy both as a book and as a concept.
Originally written as a traveller’s report about a far-away island, the book
gave a new name to a classic genre of political fiction and challenged future
moral and political thinking with its notion of an ideal society. Alluding to
the newly discovered lands that lured explorers and captivated the imagi-
nation of readers around Europe in 1516, More placed his ‘Nowhereland’ on
the other side of the ocean. Acquiring wide fame and notoriety not as a
fantasy place, but as a real example to be followed, the island of Utopia was
to become a model for future political constellations, investing the con-
cepts of ‘utopia’ and ‘utopianism’with the temporal dimension of the belief
in a dreamworld to come.
This issue of ANTW will explore both the original book and its historical
aftermath. Utopia is one of the rare works of Renaissance literature still
widely read today, yet it is also a book that even specialists have difficulty
to interpret. As so often, many of the articles in this volume emphasize the
uncertainties and ambiguities in More’s text. Should we see the book’s
description of a political alternative to Renaissance European society as a
serious recipe for a golden future, or are there further layers of interpreta-
tion to be uncovered, and other motivations hidden in More’s project? Past
and present scholars have tried to relate the political ideas put forward in
Utopia in a consistent way to the complicated biography of the Man for All
Seasons. Some have chosen for a literal interpretation, and see the book’s
recommendations as serious suggestions for altering society’s rules and
social arrangements, including, for instance, the introduction of commu-
nity labour and communist law. Others, however, have noted that Utopia is
in fact a dialogue between friends, which would offer More lots of oppor-
tunity for experiment, and his readers a certain flexibility of interpretation.
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Wayne A. Rebhorn, for instance, argued that the dialogue form offered
More a welcome chance for dissimulation:
By writing a dialogue, More could hide behind his characters, claiming that this
or that idea was not his, but merely belonged to one of them (. . .).１
Thus, he was able to avoid the ‘risk of reprisal by authorities, both secular
and religious, who might feel that what he said was subversive.’ Rebhorn
adds that the name of Utopia itself, which means ‘Noplace’, as well as the
name given to its main spokesman, Raphael Hythlodaeus, or Hythloday,
meaning ‘speaker of nonsense’, offered More even more elbow room, and
allowed him to put ‘further distance between himself and his ideas’.２
Utopia’s radical ideas would in this case still be More’s, but one could
also go a step further and claim that, as in the case of Plato’s Republic,
which was More’s main example,３ the dialogue form in fact gave a provi-
sional character to the book’s recommendations themselves. With respect
to Plato, it has been said that the ‘main lines of his philosophy’ might well
be considered as ‘thought experiments that Plato took seriously but ex-
pressed playfully in fictional dialogues instead of asserting as doctrines.’４
May More’s Utopia be seen in a similar light? J.H. Hexter, one of the editors
of the standard 1965 edition of Utopia by Yale University Press, has sug-
gested that, whilst ‘the Dialogue of Counsel’ (the passage in the first part of
Utopia in which the question is raised whether a philosopher should ac-
cept a political office and enter into public service) is a genuine dialogue,
‘the Discourse on Utopia’ presented in the second part is a ‘discursive’ text.
Only in the first part does More really talk ‘to himself, as it were,’ and he
does so in order to settle the problem ‘most immediately before him’,５
namely whether he should accept the offer of entering the Court of Henry
VIII. More would indeed soon decide to do so, and he became a ‘councillor
attendant’ upon the king in the spring of 1518.６ It is such decisions that are
1 Rebhorn (2005: xxviii).
2 Rebhorn (2005: xxviii).
3 Plato’s book is referred to right at the start of Utopia in the verse that plays on the Utopia /
Eutopia, ‘No-Place / Good-Place’- theme, as well as in Peter Giles’ letter to Jerome Busleyden only
a few lines later, and in the main text of Utopia itself. More (1965: 20/21, 86/87 and 100/101). For
other references to Plato, see More (1965: 102/103 and 104/105).
4 Press (1999: 46).
5 Hexter (1965: xxxiii-xxxvii; quotation from xxxvii). See, on the distinction between demon-
strative and deliberative genres, also Erik De Bom’s remarks, on p. 375, below.
6 Ackroyd (1998: 187).
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best dealt with in a dialogue, according to Hexter, since this is the format
in which one can freely offer arguments for and against a certain position,
and it is indeed in the first part of Utopia that More prominently stages
himself – ‘I’, Morus – next to Utopia’s main character, the exotic philoso-
pher-traveller Raphael Hythlodaeus.
As for the second part, one may follow another of Hexter’s ideas and
compare Plato’s and More’s recommendations one by one. Doing so, one is
most likely to conclude that More apparently liked certain things in Plato,
such as the abolition of private ownership, and rejected others, such as
Plato’s abolition of the nuclear family.７ Yet it is doubtful whether More
ever envisaged giving a systematic commentary on Plato’s political views.
Even in the first part of Utopia, where we find the main reference to the
Republic, More in fact lets Raphael, not Morus, speak out on behalf of
Plato’s idealism. The way, moreover, in which Raphael sets apart Platonism
and Christianity as two equally idealistic traditions that may have no effect
on ‘those who go headlong by the opposite road’ since both proliferate
unwelcome truths, makes the passage even more ambiguous.８
Yet there is another way of reading Utopia that may explain More’s
references to Plato, a way of reading Utopia only recently put forward by
Giulia Sissa, one of the editors of the present volume. Sissa claims that
Utopia should not be read as a statement of More’s political views. Nor
does More align himself to Plato. The references to Plato in the first part of
the book, for instance, do not present the Greek philosopher as an example
Morus would like to follow, but as ‘your’ – that is, Hythloday’s – ‘favourite
author’. According to Morus, Plato’s recommendation that ‘philosophers
become kings or kings turn to philosophy’ should make Hythloday, a fan of
Plato, less opposed to the idea of entering into public office, and do what
More himself was on the point of doing in 1516. Hythloday, however, the
philosopher with no attachments, will not hear of it.
Whom is More addressing here? Giulia Sissa has argued that More is
addressing his friend Erasmus. Furthermore, the whole character of Ra-
phael Hythloday, according to Sissa, ‘is a friendly parody of the author of
theMoriae Encomium’ – that is to say, of Erasmus, the author of The Praise
of Folly (1511).９ Utopia has often been seen as More’s literary reply to Eras-
mus’s book, but never before were the moral and political views pro-
pounded by Raphael Hythloday in his story about the island of Utopia
7 Hexter (1965: xli-liv and clvi-clx). See also the index, More (1965, 617).
8 More (1965: 100/101); G.C. Richards’s transalation.
9 Sissa (2012: 133).
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attributed to Erasmus instead of More. Like Utopia, Erasmus’s Praise of
Folly is itself a text that is both exceptional for its ongoing popularity five
centuries after its first publication and difficult to interpret. With Lady
Folly herself taking the floor and singing the praise of folly, there was a
deep ambiguity to begin with as to the seriousness of what Erasmus’s book
advocated. Yet if we take Hythloday to represent Erasmus, many aspects of
Utopia immediately become clear. If, in ‘the Dialogue of Counsel’, the
figure of Morus distances himself from Plato, he also distances himself
from Hythloday’s impractical Platonico-Christian idealism. Why not work
for Princes, as More would do? There is every reason that More was not
talking to himself here, but to his Dutch friend, who preferred to keep a
distance from the practical matters of politics. Erasmus was perfectly will-
ing to offer philosophical advice to kings and princes himself, but he would
do so only from the side line, and, like Raphael, refused to subtract from
either Plato’s idealism, Christ’s doctrines, or his own. Erasmus did not care
whether the views he proposed were deemed unwelcome or impractical.
Like Hythloday, he would not compromise. In the very same year that
Utopia was published, whilst More was preparing for a new political posi-
tion, Erasmus published his Platonico-Christian views on politics in The
Education of a Christian Prince. In Utopia, More gets back at his idealist
friend.
Do the discussions and disagreements between More and Erasmus form
the background to the rest of the book as well, including the description of
the ideal state of Utopia? This might certainly explain the uneasy acknowl-
edgement of humanist self-doubt with which More referred to his own
book when, on 3 September 1516, he sent Erasmus his final text in order
for it to be published in Flanders: ‘I am sending you my Nowhere, which is
nowhere well written (. . . ).’１０ But there is no reason to suspect that Erasmus
himself was in any way embarrassed. Erasmus had left London only a few
weeks before, and he must have been fully aware of the text and of More’s
plans with it.１１ He also knew how the second part of the book, with its
description of the fantasy island of Utopia, had originally been conceived
in Flanders in the summer of 1515, when More had spent some time in
Antwerp with Pieter Gillis, or Peter Giles (1486-1533), a friend of Erasmus
– and now More’s friend, too. Giles was to figure prominently in Utopia as
10 More (1961: 73).
11 As J.H. Hexter has argued, More had nothing much to explain to Erasmus, since only a few
weeks earlier both friends will certainly have talked, in London, about how to proceed towards
publication once More had drawn up a final version of the text. Cf. Hexter (1965).
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one of the eye-witnesses who, besides More and More’s pupil John Clem-
ent, had heard the story of the far-away island straight from the mouth of
the exotic philosopher-traveller Raphael Hythlodaeus, or Raphael Chatter-
talk.
In the autumn of 1516, Erasmus and Giles quickly saw Utopia through
the press, so that half way December, More was already eagerly awaiting
the arrival, in London, of the book in its first edition by Thierry Martens of
Louvain.１２ Erasmus waited with publicly giving his judgement for some
time. As he put it himself, he did not wish to let his ‘very close friendship’
with More come between himself and a justified verdict on the book. Only
when, on his own initiative, a new edition of Utopia appeared with Froben
in Basle, a year later, did Erasmus share in the widespread praise for More’s
genius.
The book
Is Erasmus himself Utopia’s main protagonist? Two contributions to the
present volume will develop the Sissa Thesis in various ways. First, Giulia
Sissa herself will offer an abundance of new arguments in favour of the
thesis she first presented in 2012. Where the reader will have to search for
the positive evidence for seeing Hythloday as an impersonation of Erasmus
in her previous work,１３ the present article focuses more particularly on the
question of the abolition of private property in Utopia, as well as on the fact
that the combination of virtue and pleasure is an Erasmian theme wholly
alien to More. Starting out from the tension in Utopia’s combination of
Platonic and Epicurean ideals, and Erasmus’ advocacy of the Platonic Uto-
pia of Kallipolis, Sissa works towards an assessment of Thomas More’s own
political views. It appears that Erasmus, not More, was the communist.
Whereas Erasmus read the Adage ‘All is common among friends’ according
to the collectivist interpretations Pythagoras and Plato had given it (and
Aristotle, Epicurus and Cicero had criticised), Thomas More, in both parts
of Utopia, opts for the Aristotelian view, dismissing Hythloday’s position as
absurd. In other works, More shows himself to be even less of a follower of
12 Only a fortnight after sending the final text to Flanders, while Peter Giles and Erasmus were
preparing the first edition for the press, More was asking Erasmus to seek recommendations from
men well-versed in politics. Within a month and a half, he expressed his delight with the people
Erasmus had gathered. For details about the correspondence between Erasmus and More regard-
ing Utopia in the autumn of 1516, see Hexter (1965).
13 Sissa (2012).
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Hythloday. While Erasmus interpreted pleasure along Platonic lines as a
divine reward for virtue, More, in the Dialogue of Comfort, produced what
Sissa calls a ‘relentless panegyric of pain’. Thomas More, in fact, argued
time and again that we should be grateful for our sufferings and tribula-
tions, since they bring us closer to God. Apart from this, More further
attested to the absurdity of Hythloday’s viewpoints in other works besides
Utopia, by showing himself to be diametrically opposed, both on social and
on religious grounds, to the idea that personal wealth should be abolished.
The conclusion that the historical More was neither a classical Platonist
or a classical Epicurean, nor a Platonist or an Epicurean in the Erasmian
sense of the word, and that he developed his moral and political views not
on the basis of philosophical views, but on the religious values of suffering,
and the desire either to leave this world or to prepare himself for it, is a
view that also emerges from Han van Ruler’s comparison of the dissimilar
ways in which Erasmus and More put to use their religious convictions.
Arguing that Hythloday’s praise for the moral philosophy of the Utopians,
though formally giving support to a Platonic and Epicurean stance, does
not show any signs of the kind of arguments Erasmus himself would have
given to defend these positions, Van Ruler suggests that even when play-
fully presenting Erasmus as Hythloday, More shows no real interest in
Erasmus’s moral philosophy. One of the most crucial aspects of Erasmus’s
moral theory is its relation to mind-body dualism, which prompted Eras-
mus to use a philosophical line of argument according to which the human
body is of neutral value to morality at most. This, again, is a theme wholly
lacking in More. Van Ruler draws a comparison between More’s and Eras-
mus’s writings on Christ’s suffering as an illustration of the way in which
Erasmus might make use of Biblical testimonies to make a moral point on
the basis of his anthropological views, whilst More shows an interest in
spiritual meaning rather than in morality, and employs the duality of flesh
and spirit only to emphasize the idea that Holy Writ is full of hidden
meaning. Paradoxically, Erasmus’s indifference to the physical part of
man was motivated by moral and social aims, whilst More’s interest in
man’s physical side was inspired by the body’s presumed spiritual signifi-
cance. Seen in this light, Utopia presents us with views that seem ulti-
mately to belong to neither author, but rather to express the way in
which More read, or at least was able to tease, Erasmus.
Did Thomas More not endorse any of the positions Utopia takes up?
Defending the two humanists against charges of inconsistency as well as
against present-day bias to the things Renaissance men may have held
dear, Van Ruler does not rule out the possibility that More may at least
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have sympathised with some of the effects he imagined might be intended
in Erasmus’s call for a cultural transformation in the direction of reason. If
so, More’s parody may have been charitable, yet both Sissa’s and Van
Ruler’s contributions reinforce the idea that Utopia offered a subject-mat-
ter in many ways unconventional, not to say wholly alien, to Thomas More
himself.
Thomas More himself has to be taken very seriously. And yet, this ex-
ceptionally coherent personality belongs to the environment of intimate
friendships, intellectual exchanges, and on-going conversations. On the
one hand, Van Ruler’s and Sissa’s contributions corroborate the scholarly
imperative to place Utopia in the context of Erasmian humanism. On the
other, they do justice to the difference between Morus and Erasmus. Over
the years, all major scholars have systematically read the dialogue on the
best state of a commonwealth precisely in the shadow of Erasmus’ ideas
and works. This contextualization works only too well. It proves much
more rewarding than to try to reconcile Utopian features with Thomas
More’s own values. Hence various interpretations that rely on the sup-
posed existence of irony, ambivalence, contradiction, or a change of heart
on the part of Thomas More. Recent studies, however, such as those of
Marie-Claire Phélippeau, Gerard Wegemer and Travis Curtright place Uto-
pia not only in this Erasmian context, but also in that of Thomas More’s
other writings. As Travis Curtright writes, ‘the pendulum of More studies
returns to less eristic analyses of his work.’１４
Centuries of interpretation have nevertheless built on the idea that
Utopia in one way or another contains More’s political philosophy. Nor
are readers to be blamed if they cannot trust the name by which someone
presents himself as the author of a book. Consequently, the book and its
author, Utopia and Thomas More, acquired an array of different faces over
the years – and indeed, in a way, another Thomas More was born in 1516.
For despite the Sissa Thesis, there is no sense in denying the existence of a
Thomas More who is the author of a fiction called Utopia, and who, for
over a period of five hundred years, has been read, hailed, and criticized,
for what he made others believe he believed, even if he did not believe
himself in the ideal society it presented. To honour this more traditional
More and his legacy, the present volume has collected a number of essays
that, besides the book itself and the personal history involved in its mak-
ing, discuss issues of relevance to the traditional Thomas More by examin-
ing Utopia’s early reception and by weighing arguments for and against the
14 Curtright (2012: 10). See also Wegemer (1990: 288-306) and Phélippeau (2016).
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utopian way of thinking that More – not Erasmus – created, with his book
on the ideal society and with the contribution he thereby made to the
history of political theory.
Original reception
Questions of realism, idealism, practical steering, and the nature of man,
are also addressed in the contributions to this volume that do not concen-
trate primarily on a comparison between Erasmus and More. Next to the
two initial studies of Utopia itself, the reader will find two historical essays
on the early reception of More’s book. Covering both sides of the Channel
More had crossed to meet Peter Giles – and, presumably, Raphael Hythlo-
day’s archetype – in Antwerp, Erik De Bom concentrates on Utopia’s early
reception within sixteenth-century political theory in the Netherlands,
whilst Guido Giglioni offers a comparison between More’s classic and A
Discourse of the Commonweal of This Realm of England, a lesser known
dialogue by Thomas Smith (1513-1577), who, like More, was an Englishman
in high public office with a literary interest in philosophical and economic
theory.
In his article on the reception of Utopia in the Netherlands, Erik De Bom
addresses the question in what way More’s draft for an ideal society differs
from contemporary alternatives by Erasmus and Machiavelli. Arguing that
More did not share Erasmus’s optimism about the perfectibility of man,
but still believed society might be changed in positive ways by changing
the way in which society was organised, De Bom characterizes Utopia’s
political theory as a reaction to the misguided idea of trying to change
citizens or princes. Utopia proposes to change the institutional set up of
society instead. A certain sense of realism thus drewMore towards the idea
of forcing citizens to comply with moral standards. As De Bom shows,
however, Utopia had relatively little impact on early-modern philosophical
debate in the Low Countries. It was rather Machiavelli’s type of realism
that set the new standard and posed a challenge to new contributions in
political theory. As De Bom explains, Justus Lipsius (1547-1606) would
follow Machiavelli in his realism, whilst at the same time adding argu-
ments taken from historical sources to underline the positive value of
checks and restrictions on what a prince might do. Leornardus Lessius
(1554-1623), by contrast, developed a further type of political realism by
combining ethical concerns with legal rules in a manner reminiscent of
the Flemish lawyer Nicolaes Everaerts (c. 1462-1532), another acquaintance
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of Erasmus, whose Topica had appeared in the same year, and with the
same publisher, as More’s Utopia.
Whereas, in Erik De Bom’s article, Utopia accordingly figures as a book
that drew attention away from the perfectibility of man towards the idea of
changes to be made to society, a new type of idealism in Utopia comes to
the fore in Guido Giglioni’s contribution, an idealism which, rather than
being concerned with mental conditions, is focused on the material condi-
tions of life. Comparing More’s work with that of Thomas Smith, Giglioni
stresses the way in which the issue of agricultural production led More to
endorse a positive belief in the ability to ensure a society without want.
In Giglioni’s reading, Utopia, with its extensive discussion of enclosures,
hunger, the need to steal, and the hangings that result from this, bears
More’s personal stamp especially in its way of arguing for taking away
‘the fear of want’ by utopian economic measures. Indeed, according to
Giglioni, ‘Utopia is first and foremost about hunger.’
Through its systematic deployment of physical labour, Utopia’s laws
were designed to offer economic solutions and to rescue its inhabitants
from being trapped in a Faustian grip between greed and fear. As Julien
Kloeg proposes in this volume with respect to the equal distribution of
goods in Utopia, ‘there are similarities’ here, ‘to the modern welfare state.’
More’s emphasis on the corporeal side of human well-being, as well as his
preoccupations with agricultural and economic questions, may accord-
ingly be read as evidence of a rather down-to-earth, or even ‘materialist’,
type of idealism in More. At the same time, Giglioni’s comparison of More
and Smith may serve to indicate to what extent More held on to an un-
compromising enforcement of moral codes and collectivist consequences.
Smith, by contrast, accepted the idea that there might be socially construc-
tive effects to a yearning for profit, thus, as Giglioni writes, presenting the
‘self-acquisitive nature of man’ as a ‘positive trait’. Giglioni’s article shows
that even in its sixteenth-century setting, the debate on political utopian-
ism might foreshadow modern debates on the negative and positive eva-
luations of human appetites, and on the necessity either to curb these or to
set them free. Countless debates in economics and politics have since
added to More’s and Smith’s discussion of the relative weight of collectivist
and individualist approaches to the organisation of society, and it is in the
context of such political debates that the legacy of Utopia is arguably most
often referred to.
Complementing the four historical studies in the first part, the articles
in the second part of this volume will debate the pros and cons of visionary
political thinking as such, and thereby offer a variety of views on utopian-
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ism rather than on Utopia. Instead of continuing the discussion between
communism and free trade, between capitalism and the planned economy,
these four contributions will bring together two critical as well as two
constructive essays on the concept of an ideal world. The two critical
essays will cast doubt on the idea of a utopia, the first from a theoretical
standpoint and the second in the form of a critique on current applications
of the utopian view in questions of health care. Lastly, two favourable
appreciations of utopian thinking will address its ongoing value in political
thought, as well as the fruitful manner in which More’s way of presenting
his ideal society links up with epistemologically effective ways of applying
thought experiments to reality.
Philosophical criticism
In the wake of twentieth-century political experiments no longer trusted
and in the light of famous literary warnings against totalitarian control, the
notion of a political Paradise has come to worry us today. Thomas More
does not figure in Karl Popper’s famous condemnation of totalitarianism,
but Utopia would be an obvious candidate to be added to Popper’s list of
intellectualist expectations that may lead to authoritarian rule. More might
thus easily be counted amongst the enemies of the free society, but it is not
the intention of the two critical essays here presented to read Utopia sim-
ply as a follow-up to Plato or as a preamble of Soviet politics. Rather, both
contributions question the possibility that one might meaningfully design
a future state of affairs in which human beings are relieved from some of
their most troublesome needs and aspirations.
If Utopia is the expression of a desire to overcome aspects of human
existence that keep us in a state of emotional instability and wavering
happiness, utopian thinking, according to the philosophical criticisms
here voiced by the two Louvain philosophers Arnold Burms and Herman
De Dijn, is mistaken in its way of imagining ideals that do not in fact fit the
human condition.
Burms notices that utopianism has no regard for two basic human
needs: the need to make sense of things we cannot control and the need
to attract the positive attention of others. With respect to the first, Burms
points at the examples of honouring the dead and of punishing criminal
behaviour. Honouring the dead is something human beings are deeply
committed to, but it is an obligation that cannot be understood in terms
of rational justifications. With respect to the example of punishment,
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Burms introduces the concept of ‘symbolic restoration’ and argues that
blame and punishment are expressions of a ‘deeply ingrained attitude’
that does not correspond to any utilitarian goal. The second basic human
need, the need to attract the attention of others and to get their recogni-
tion, has the typical characteristic that it can never be fulfilled if it is not
accompanied by the belief that there is indeed a true ground for the recog-
nition itself, or if it is not accompanied with a recognition of the symbolic
significance of specific social roles in the public sphere. Forms of utilitarian
thinking, according to Burms, habitually disregard such elementary truths.
Human beings do not simply wish to be helped by seeing others fulfil all
sorts of conditions. Rather, they have ‘the desire to be appreciated and to
be engaged in significant activities.’ The utopian dilemma that results from
this is especially transparent in transhumanist ideals, Burms argues, since
although these futuristic visions of post-human existence carry the pro-
mise that they will ameliorate things for us, they actually introduce the
problematic desire to become something we are not. Although utopian
thinking may be useful in so far as it expresses a desire for self-transcen-
dence, the notion to become self-creators can only make us ‘aliens to
ourselves’.
Whereas Burms criticizes the utopian dream from the viewpoint that it
ignores deeply embedded human desires, Herman De Dijn criticizes recent
developments in society that are nevertheless aimed at an effectuation of
the utopian dream, and warns against the loss of moral sensitivities that
may result from this. Drawing a sharp contrast between the conventional
practice of providing aid to someone in physical distress and the funda-
mental inability to relieve the unfulfilled desires for happiness or recogni-
tion in others, De Dijn sets the stage for a critique of the current tendency
to medicalize and therapeutize spheres of human experience and beha-
viour that, although they were previously not considered to be part of
medical science, are nowadays delegated to the domain of health care.
The interest in securing both the health and the happiness of individuals
has in fact given a new meaning to the concept of health itself and has set
new standards for human goals in life, both of which are based on the
notion of ‘the quality of life’. De Dijn critically discusses these develop-
ments, along with the accompanying changes in the relationship between
(medical) professionals and those searching for help. Dispensing with the
traditional ‘paternalistic’ interpretation of the respective roles of caretaker
and patient, and giving way to transhumanist ways of thinking, both the
new views on health and the altered relationship between consultant and
client are set into an ideological perspective of self-empowerment and
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customer demand, and it is here that, according to De Dijn, a new utopian-
ism comes to the fore.
De Dijn sees the kind of ‘managerial rationality’ apparent in contempor-
ary health care as a form of ‘soft utilitarianism’. Contrary to the old, totali-
tarian, forms of political utopianism, this new type of utopian thinking is
fully adapted to liberal-democratic ideals, but it is no less characterized by
a mistaken desire for what De Dijn calls the ‘elimination of insecurity’, and
a desire for complete control. More importantly, according to De Dijn, this
new utopianism is marked by a total incapacity to understand or even to
recognize evil, as the ideology of perfection leaves no place for ethical
sensibilities and thus no room for moral boundaries or transgressions to
be conceptualized. Whether this new utopianism is simply to be accepted
as a fact of present-day life, De Dijn wishes to leave to the reader, but he
does note that a certain malaise is actually being felt within certain sectors
of health care today, and suggests that, against the despair inevitably
brought about by the quest for utopian happiness, a case should be made
for hope as the ‘truly “utopian” attitude’.
Philosophical acclaim
Of the two favourable appreciations of utopian thinking that complete this
volume, the first is a partly historical, partly philosophical, essay on the
concept of ‘utopia’ in political thought; the second an appraisal of the logic
of utopian thinking as a philosophical technique.
If Utopia did not figure in Karl Popper’s attack on Plato, Julien Kloeg’s
article ‘Utopianism and its Discontents’ offers a fine selection of the most
important works in political philosophy in which it does. Despite its bad
historical reputation and the problematic fit of the concept of ‘utopia’ in
such intellectual developments as the empirical turn in political thought
prompted by David Easton (1917-2014) and the suspicion against ‘grand
narratives’ in post-modernism, utopian types of thinking still survive today.
Kloeg first analyses the ambiguous relationship between Marxism and
utopianism on the basis of Marx’s and Engels’s criticism of utopian social-
ism. This ambiguity persists in twentieth-century political philosophy.
Kloeg examines the element of utopianism introduced in the work of
John Rawls, and discusses its relevance in the light of twentieth-century
denunciations of utopianism. Rawls’s contribution may be read as a resta-
tement of the need for normativity besides scientific examination. Rawls
himself, however, was attacked by Amartya Sen for having endorsed a
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wholly contingent interpretation of justice. On the basis of Pablo Gilabert’s
reaction to Sen, Kloeg discusses to what extent the concept of utopia may
still offer a useful tool within political philosophy today, on account of its
effectiveness for identifying problems, its criticism of the status quo, and
its motivational strength.
If More’s intellectual strategy may still be expedient for political reasons
despite the widespread intellectual and historical distrust of utopianism, it
may even be crucial for epistemological reasons. As Tim De Mey argues in
the final contribution to this volume, More’s approach actually enables a
fair assessment of different positions with respect to the political future. De
Mey takes up the defence of More’s integrity by suggesting a reading of
Utopia that acknowledges its role as an evaluative thought experiment that
leaves it to the readers to form their own opinion and decide between a
variety of positions. Agreeing that the reader of Utopia has to make ‘crucial
interpretative decisions for himself’, De Mey explains More’s strategy as a
functional deployment of an ‘exacerbated ambiguity’ that adds to its value
as a thought experiment. Although this ambiguity works differently in the
case of Utopia than it does in the case of counterfactual or conceptual
thought-experiments, De Mey argues that More’s similar way of magnify-
ing the effects of social measures and political choices not only serves to
verify Thomas More’s intellectual integrity, but adds to the concept of
‘utopia’ on epistemological grounds.
Ideas and skeletons
Whether or not it was Thomas More’s intention to tease Erasmus, or to
provide ideas and arguments, or even solutions, in political theory, is again
a question the editors would like to invite the readers to form their own
opinion upon, in the hope that the many options for reading Utopia and for
evaluating the concept of utopianism presented in this volume will con-
tribute in new ways to the broad spectrum of historical interpretations and
philosophical views that Thomas More’s book has provoked over the past
five hundred years.
If Utopia’s message may seem elusive, part of its elusiveness is the effect
of a certain duplicity in Renaissance forms of expression, in which practical
matters of morality and politics might lay hidden in high-minded notions
of spiritual growth, just as purely idealist anticipations might be cast in the
language of down-to-earth material progress. Indeed, pre-modern articu-
lations may evoke modernist viewpoints as much as they may conceal
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utterly pre-modern motivations – and this is so not only because our
language differs from More’s, but also because human expectancies and
beliefs have developed greatly over the past five centuries. In order to meet
the enigmas still hidden in Utopia’s text as well as in More’s motivations,
and to acknowledge the problems we encounter in trying to decide on the
right evaluation of utopianism, the editors have chosen to enliven the out-
ward appearance of this volume with no less ambiguous an illustration.
There are many Renaissance depictions of St. Jerome in his study, but
the painting by an anonymous Flemish artist in the style of Joos van Cleve
which presumably dates back to the 1530s or 1540s and is now in the
possession of the Rotterdam Boymans van Beuningen Museum, is espe-
cially suggestive of the topics presented in this volume. In this picture, we
see St. Jerome, the exemplary scholar and Church Father who was, in many
ways, Erasmus’s model theologian, looking somewhat desperate, but still
reasonably unconcerned, even faintly amused – indeed, the whole painting
is rather amusing.
Depictions of the Church Father in his philosopher’s cell were as com-
mon as the lion that traditionally accompanied St. Jerome. Other elements
in Renaissance depictions of the learned Saint were equally standard, but it
is not always easy to establish their intended meaning. Candles and skulls,
for instance, have been interpreted in the case of Jerome as symbols of
spiritual rebirth and divine illumination, yet such was the volatility of
Renaissance symbolism that outside Jerome’s cell, these skulls and candles
(either burning or extinguished), along with other signs of temporality and
finitude such as hourglasses and dead flowers, would soon acquire notori-
ety as still-life reminders of the medieval motif ofMemento Mori within the
Renaissance tradition of Vanitas paintings.
In the case of St. Jerome, these symbols of vanity may have functioned
as figurative contrasts to the Church Father’s religious aspirations, or to the
eternal wisdom he was dealing with, but in the case of our anonymous
painting, with its HOMO BVLLA (‘Man is a bubble’) inscription on the wall,
there can be little doubt that the whole scene leans towards a Vanitas
interpretation. The friendly face as well as the gesture of one of Erasmus’s
favourite Church Fathers in this picture may well serve to epitomize Uto-
pia’s purpose, if part of what More wished to communicate was to question
the ephemeral and all-too-human idealism of his friend, but it may equally
symbolize a form of irony with respect to the notion of ‘utopia’ as such.
With its township in the background and St. Jerome pointing downwards
to the skull, the picture in fact suggests a questioning of political hopes and
expectations tout court.
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It also forms an interesting counterpart to the map of Utopia in the wood-
cut that, probably at the request of Erasmus, Ambrosius Holbein (c. 1594-
after 1519) made for the frontispiece of the 1518 Froben edition of More’s
book. It is this image that has developed into the standard illustration of
Utopia. Pointing upwards to his political dreamland, Raphael Hythloday in
the lower left hand corner of this picture illustrates an enthusiasm that is
the exact opposite of the irony implied in the portrait of the Saint on the
cover of this issue, and if St. Jerome’s message of human bubble-status may
serve as a rejoinder to Hythloday’s utopian Babbletalk, both images are
also a reminder of the way in which intellectual idealism had been asso-
ciated only a few years earlier with pointed fingers up and down in Rafael’s
Italian namesake’s picture of The School of Athens. Not only does Plato,
the classic representative of reasoned utopianism, point upwards in Ra-
phael’s fresco just as Hythloday does in Ambrosius’s woodcut – he is also
confronted with a downward gesture that, just like St. Jerome’s finger,
served typically as a way of tempering intellectual arrogance.
And yet, if St. Jerome’s gesture put a cautious question mark to human
philosophical aspirations, its symbolism may provide an emblematic refer-
ence to Utopia in an even more literal sense. Irony has it that, with a
dentist’s eye to x-ray revelations of the anatomical features of the human
cranium, Malcolm Bishop in 2005 revealed that Ambrosius had hidden a
skull in his map of Utopia, just as his younger brother Hans (c. 1497-1553)
had added a skull to the famous picture of The Ambassadors (1533) that is
now in the possession of the London National Gallery.１５
Offering a mirror-image of the picture of the island that had occurred in
the original 1516 edition, Ambrosius skillfully added the pointing figure of
Hythloday as the neck part to an inclined human skull, the teeth of which
are camouflaged in the boat on the foreground, as much as the eye sockets
are hidden in two mountainous areas on the island. Dentists and non-
dentists alike who detect for themselves the image hidden in the 1518
woodcut will henceforth fail to be able to overlook the emblem of death
concealed in the standard illustration of Utopia.
As Malcolm Bishop argued, the idea of hiding a skull may have been just
another pun, possibly envisioned by Erasmus, upon More’s name, since, in
the eyes of the joker, Memento Mori (‘Remember you must die’) is ex-
changeable for ‘Think of More’. Yet there may also have been other reasons
to link More’s Utopia to a Memento Mori-theme. In fact, all Erasmus’s own
moral and social idealism was impregnated with a religious motivation
15 Bishop (2005).
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that may remind us of the vanitas-type of symbolism traditionally linked to
St. Jerome as much as it reminded Erasmus himself of a Platonic indiffer-
ence to the world on the basis of which life itself was seen as a preparation
for death.
It is quite possible that the problems of interpretation with regard to
Utopia, as much as the tension between realism and idealism and the
varying appreciations of utopianism itself, were all too clear even to our
humanist masterminds themselves, who knew how to read Renaissance
emblematic representations such as the anonymous Jerome, or Ambrosius’
woodcut. In their way of combining the image of faraway vistas filled with
heavenly expectance with the hidden, or even material, presence of tokens
of disaster and death, both of these illustrations give expression to the
hope invested in new trials, as much as they warn against the calamities
that are to be expected from human hubris. As if to say that there are
always two sides to a coin, both images associate human aspirations with
the possibility of doom. And all of them, not only the Flemish St. Jerome
and Holbein’s woodcut, but also Thomas More’s Utopia itself, no doubt did
so with an ominous undertone as well as a meaningful wink.
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